本文英文原文節(jié)選自美國能源部能源信息統(tǒng)計署《Annual Energy Outlook 2014 with projections to 2040》，譯文為博主自譯，未經(jīng)譯審。本人承諾尊重DOE網(wǎng)站的版權(quán)，不將該文和譯文用于商業(yè)用途，僅供國內(nèi)關(guān)注核電人士參考！若引用譯文需標(biāo)注出處！

博主微評：NRC采取了一個近中遠(yuǎn)期相結(jié)合、現(xiàn)場改進(jìn)行動和法規(guī)修訂制定相結(jié)合的體系性的嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)、務(wù)實的福島應(yīng)對行動，其系列改進(jìn)行動和陸續(xù)出臺的法規(guī)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)值得國內(nèi)同行進(jìn)一步研究。福島核事故是核工業(yè)的一場災(zāi)難，但它帶給了核工業(yè)進(jìn)一步改進(jìn)提升的啟示，相信這些行動可以促進(jìn)全球核行業(yè)安全業(yè)績進(jìn)一步提升。

LR4. U.S. response to the nuclear accident at Fukushima Daiichi

LR4、美國應(yīng)對福島核事故

Since the March 2011 accident at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the U.S. nuclear industry have been working to address issues related to the accident. The NRC and the U.S. nuclear industry initiated an immediate coordinated response to the accident, as well as long-term actions intended to assure the safety of operating and planned reactors in the United States. The ultimate cost of complying with NRC orders and proposed regulations and industry-led initiatives remains uncertain, as do the potential impacts on nuclear power plant operations. Although they are not specifically modeled in AEO2014, NRC actions and industry initiatives are being monitored by EIA so that potential costs and operational impacts can be included in future AEOs.

2011年3月日本福島第一核電站事故以來，美國核管理委員會（NRC）和美國核工業(yè)一直致力于處理（該）事故相關(guān)問題。核管理委員會和美國核工業(yè)發(fā)起了即刻協(xié)調(diào)事故應(yīng)對行動，并推動旨在確保美國在運(yùn)和擬建核反應(yīng)堆安全的長期的行動。符合NRC工作令和所建議的法規(guī)、行業(yè)主導(dǎo)的行動所帶來的最終成本仍然是不確定的，對核電站運(yùn)營的潛在影響也具不確定性。雖然他們不是專門為《AEO2014》進(jìn)行專述，NRC的行動和核行業(yè)舉措也被列入了EIA（美國能源信息統(tǒng)計署）的監(jiān)督范圍，這樣潛在成本和運(yùn)行影響可以包括在未來的年度能源展望(AEOs）中。

The NRC conducted a systematic and methodical review of its own processes and regulations in light of the accident at Fukushima. On July 12, 2011, the NRC’s Near-Term Task Force released its report, Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century . The report contains 12 recommendations, including both short- and long-term actions for consideration, and prioritizes the implementation of the recommendations.

NRC依據(jù)自己的流程和法規(guī)針對福島核電站事故進(jìn)行了系統(tǒng)的、有條理的審查。2011年7月12日，NRC近期工作小組發(fā)表報告《提高第二十一世紀(jì)反應(yīng)堆安全建議》。該報告包含了12項建議，包括短期行動、長期行動以及優(yōu)先考慮的建議執(zhí)行事項等。

In order to address the short-term recommendations, the NRC issued three orders in March 2012 that require nuclear power plants to implement measures related to lessons learned from the Fukushima accident, as follows:

為了解決短期問題，NRC于2012年3月發(fā)出了三個工作令，要求核電廠實施福島核事故教訓(xùn)的相關(guān)措施，如下：

• All boiling-water reactors (BWRs) with Mark I and II containment systems must have reliable hardened containment venting capability to reduce pressure and hydrogen buildup. This may require improving or replacing existing containment ventilation systems .

•所有使用馬克I和馬克II型安全殼的沸水反應(yīng)堆（BWR）必須有可靠的固化的安全殼通風(fēng)能力以降低安全殼壓力和氫氣濃度。這可能需要改進(jìn)或更換現(xiàn)有的安全殼通風(fēng)系統(tǒng)。

• Reactors must have enhanced instrumentation installed to monitor water levels in their spent fuel pools in the event of an emergency .

•反應(yīng)堆必須安裝強(qiáng)化乏燃料池儀表以監(jiān)測在應(yīng)急事件情況下的水位。

• Nuclear power plants must be capable of responding to multiple simultaneous events and ensuring that reactors and spent fuel pools remain cooled. The order specifies a three-phase approach involving use of installed on-site resources, use of portable on-site equipment, and indefinite use of off-site resources .

•核電廠必須能夠響應(yīng)多個同時發(fā)生的事件并確保反應(yīng)堆和乏燃料池保持冷卻。工作令還指定了一個包括可使用安裝在現(xiàn)場的電源、使用現(xiàn)場便攜式設(shè)備以及無限期使用的場外電源等在內(nèi)的三相（接入）方法。

The NRC stated that, in all cases, the existing fleet of reactors can continue operating safely while implementing the orders. The orders were effective immediately and included timetables for responses and actions.

NRC表示，在所有情況下，執(zhí)行工作令后所有在運(yùn)反應(yīng)堆群都可以繼續(xù)安全運(yùn)行。工作令，包括應(yīng)對和行動時間表在內(nèi)均立即生效。

In the three orders listed above, the NRC required an integrated plan to be submitted by February 2013, with initial status reports due in 60 days. The NRC specified that operating reactors must complete modifications within two refueling cycles after submitting an integrated plan, or by the end of 2016, whichever comes first. Any reactor with a construction permit issued under 10 CFR Part 50 (e.g., Watts Bar Unit 2) was required to comply with the above orders prior to receiving an operating license. Any reactor issued a Combined Operating License (COL) under 10 CFR Part 52 (i.e., Vogtle Units 3 and 4 and Summer Units 2 and 3) was required to implement all requirements in the orders before the initial fuel loading. Compliance assessments are underway at nuclear power plants. The requirements of the orders remain in place until superseded by other orders or rulemaking. As discussed below, NRC is considering or has initiated rulemaking on several topics, and some of the dates established in the original orders have been modified.

上述三個工作令中，NRC要求不遲于2013年2月提交一個綜合計劃并在60天內(nèi)提交初始狀態(tài)報告。NRC規(guī)定提交綜合計劃后，在運(yùn)反應(yīng)堆必須在兩個換料周期內(nèi)或2016年底前（以先到者為準(zhǔn)）完成改造。依據(jù)10 CFR Part 50獲頒了建造許可證的任何反應(yīng)堆（例如，Watts Bar #2機(jī)組）在接受運(yùn)營許可前必須符合上述工作令【譯者備注，NRC原來的執(zhí)照分為建造許可證和運(yùn)營許可證，現(xiàn)改為發(fā)放建造運(yùn)營聯(lián)合許可證COL了】。任何依據(jù)10 CFR Part 52獲頒建造運(yùn)營聯(lián)合許可證（COL）的反應(yīng)堆（例如V.C.Summer#3、4機(jī)組和Vogtle#2、3機(jī)組）被要求在開始首爐裝料前執(zhí)行所有工作令要求。核電廠正在進(jìn)行符合性評估。工作令要求在被其它指令或規(guī)則替代前保留合適狀態(tài)（確保執(zhí)行）。正如下面討論的，NRC正在考慮或已經(jīng)在若干重點(diǎn)開始制定規(guī)則，并且最初工作令中建立的部分（計劃）日期已經(jīng)進(jìn)行了修改。

In November 2012, as an addition to the original order issued to address more robust containment venting systems, the NRC began considering whether to propose a rule that would require containment venting systems to filter all releases during an accident for boiling water reactors with Mark I and Mark II containments . If the NRC decides to pursue such a rulemaking, a final rule could be issued in 2017 .

2012年11月，如同最初工作令的一個附件用于處理更強(qiáng)大安全殼通風(fēng)系統(tǒng)，NRC開始考慮是否提出一個規(guī)則，它將要求采用馬克一型和馬克二型安全殼的沸水堆的安全殼通風(fēng)系統(tǒng)在事故期間過濾掉所有排放物（放射性）。如果委員會決定制定這樣的規(guī)則，這個最終規(guī)則可能將于2017年發(fā)布。

Utilities continue to provide documentation to the NRC on equipment procured to respond to a prolonged loss of power at a reactor (station blackout) as well as spent fuel pool water level monitoring instrumentation. In March 2013, the NRC decided to proceed with a rulemaking to address station blackout mitigation . In its July 2013 regulatory basis document , the NRC noted: “One dual-unit site estimated that the order may cost approximately $25 million, while a second dual-unit site estimated the cost at $43 million.” The final rule is scheduled for issuance by December 2016.

公用事業(yè)繼續(xù)就反應(yīng)堆長時間失去電源（全廠失電）應(yīng)對所用設(shè)備和乏燃料水池水位監(jiān)測儀表事宜向NRC提供文件。2013年3月，委員會決定著手制定規(guī)則來處理全廠斷電緩解問題。在其2013年7月監(jiān)管基礎(chǔ)文獻(xiàn)中NRC說到：“一個雙機(jī)組廠址按此指令預(yù)計可能耗資約2500萬美元，當(dāng)?shù)诙€雙機(jī)組廠址估計費(fèi)用在4300萬美元。”最終規(guī)則將于2016年12月發(fā)布。

By June 2013, two detailed inspections (or “walkdowns”) had been completed at each reactor to evaluate potential seismic and flooding hazards. The NRC is in the process of auditing the results of the walkdowns. All flooding re-evaluations are due to the NRC by March 2015 . The NRC will review the analyses and issue a safety assessment for each site. For nuclear power plants requiring a seismic risk analysis, the NRC performed a prioritization of plants in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) and the Western United States (WUS). Plants in more seismically active WUS and CEUS locations will complete risk evaluations by June 2017, and those in less active CEUS locations will complete risk evaluations by December 2019 [41].

截至2013年6月，所有反應(yīng)堆都完成了兩項詳細(xì)檢查（或“逐項巡查”）以評估潛在的地震和洪水災(zāi)害。NRC正在進(jìn)行逐項巡查結(jié)果的審計。2015年3月前NRC將完成所有的洪水再評估工作。NRC將針對每一個廠址審計其分析結(jié)論并簽署安全性評估（意見）。考慮到核電廠都需要進(jìn)行地震風(fēng)險分析，NRC優(yōu)先執(zhí)行美國中東部（CEUS）和美國西部（WUS）的核電廠。地處中東部（CEUS）地震比較活躍地段和西部（CEUS）的電廠將于2017年6月前完成風(fēng)險評估，那些（地震）不活躍的的中東部廠址將于2019年12月前完成風(fēng)險評估。

In November 2013, the NRC announced proposed rulemaking language to “. . . strengthen and integrate onsite emergency response capabilities.” The final rule, which is likely to be issued in March 2016, is expected to address accident mitigation strategies; integration of accident mitigation procedures; identification of command and control roles during an accident; conduct of drills and exercises; training; and include severe accident situations in examinations for reactor operators. In its comments on the NRC’s draft regulatory basis , the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) estimated a cost of $17 million for the nuclear fleet— or $275,000 per unit—to develop and implement new training plans. NEI also estimated increased training costs of $250,000 per site per year and annual severe accident drill costs of $250,000 per site.

2013年11月，NRC宣布擬提議的法規(guī)語言”...加強(qiáng)和整合現(xiàn)場應(yīng)急反應(yīng)能力。”可能于2016年3月發(fā)布的最終法規(guī)，有望解決事故緩解策略；事故緩解過程的整合；事故發(fā)生過程中的指揮和控制角色的識別；訓(xùn)練、演習(xí)、培訓(xùn)開展；以及包括在反應(yīng)堆操作員考試中的嚴(yán)重事故情況。在NRC法規(guī)草案基礎(chǔ)的評論中，核能研究所（NEI）估計反應(yīng)堆群將花費(fèi)1700萬美元或每臺機(jī)組27.5萬美元以開發(fā)和實施新的培訓(xùn)計劃。NEI還估計每個廠址每年將增加25萬美元，每年每個廠址增加的用于年度嚴(yán)重事故培訓(xùn)成本約25萬美元。

In addition to the NRC actions described above, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), and NEI formed a Fukushima Response Steering Committee to integrate and coordinate the industry’s response to the accident. In February 2012, the Steering Committee jointly released a report, The Way Forward: U.S. Industry Leadership in Response to Events at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, which discusses activities to oversee and coordinate responses to emergencies . INPO prepared a detailed report on post-accident events at Fukushima Daiichi [46], and on November 11, 2011, the detailed report was provided to the U.S. Congress, the NRC, and the U.S. nuclear industry. The nuclear industry, through NEI, developed its FLEX strategy—a comprehensive, flexible, and integrated plan to mitigate the effects of severe natural phenomena and to take steps to achieve safety benefits quickly . The FLEX approach, implemented in 2012, was informed by the industry’s response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States. Two regional response centers will be located near Memphis, Tennessee, and Phoenix, Arizona. From those regional response centers, critical emergency equipment can be delivered to nuclear power plants within 24 hours. The regional response centers are planned to be fully operational by August 2014 .

除了上述的NRC行動，電力科學(xué)研究院（EPRI），核電運(yùn)行研究所（INPO），和NEI形成了福島應(yīng)對指導(dǎo)委員會以整合和協(xié)調(diào)行業(yè)對（福島）事故的應(yīng)對。2012年2月，指導(dǎo)委員會聯(lián)合發(fā)布了一份報告《前進(jìn)的道路：美國行業(yè)在應(yīng)對福島第一核電站事故的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位》，它討論了監(jiān)督行為和突發(fā)事件的協(xié)同應(yīng)對。INPO準(zhǔn)備了一份福島第一核電廠事故后事件的詳細(xì)報告，2011年11月11日，該詳細(xì)報告提供給了美國國會、NRC和美國核工業(yè)。核工業(yè)通過NEI發(fā)布了它的FLEX戰(zhàn)略——一個全面、靈活和集成的規(guī)劃以降低嚴(yán)重自然現(xiàn)象的影響及采取措施盡快達(dá)到安全效益。Flex方法，在2012年執(zhí)行時，核工業(yè)被告知用以應(yīng)對2001年9月11日發(fā)生在美國的恐怖襲擊。2個區(qū)域性應(yīng)急中心將毗鄰田納西州的孟菲斯和亞利桑那州鳳凰城。從這些區(qū)域響應(yīng)中心出發(fā)，關(guān)鍵的應(yīng)急設(shè)備可在24小時內(nèi)交付給核電站。區(qū)域響應(yīng)中心計劃在2014年8月全面運(yùn)營。

In addition to activities that focus on reactors and the utilities that operate them, the NRC has spent more than two years evaluating how best to respond to the first of the 12 recommendations made in the July 2011 Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident , which recommended establishment of a “logical, systematic, and coherent regulatory framework for adequate protection that appropriately balances defense-in-depth and risk considerations.” Defense-in-depth is a layered approach to safety that involves the use of multiple redundant and independent safety systems. NRC’s evaluation of this recommendationwas discussed publicly in January 2014 and included proposed actions on a policy statement that would detail, among other things, the decision criteria for ensuring adequate defense-in-depth. The proposed actions also identify the need to clarify the role of voluntary industry initiatives in the NRC regulatory process.

除了關(guān)注反應(yīng)堆以及運(yùn)行它們的公用事業(yè)行為外，NRC已經(jīng)花了兩年多的時間評估如何最好地應(yīng)對2011年7月從福島第一核電廠事故監(jiān)督伸出中得出的近期任務(wù)行動審計提出的12項建議中的第一批任務(wù)，它建議建立一個“邏輯性的、系統(tǒng)性的、連貫性的監(jiān)管框架，以適度平衡縱深防御和風(fēng)險考慮的額外保護(hù)。”縱深防御是一個分層的安全方法，涉及多個冗余和獨(dú)立的安全系統(tǒng)的使用。NRC就這項建議的評價于2014年1月被公開討論，且包括在一項政策聲明提議的行動內(nèi)，該聲明詳述了在其他事項中確保足夠的縱深防御的決策標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。該提議行動還識別了用以澄清NRC規(guī)制程序中行業(yè)的自愿行動角色的需求。

The ultimate cost to the nuclear industry of addressing Fukushima-related issues remains uncertain, as do the potential impacts on nuclear power plant operations. In a meeting with the NRC in April 2013, Dominion Energy estimated that the cost of post-Fukushima actions could be $30 to $40 million per unit and $180 to $240 million for its fleet of six units [51, 52]. AEO2014 does not include potential post-Fukushima effects on nuclear capacity and generation, but costs and operational impacts will be monitored for inclusion in future AEOs as NRC actions and industry initiatives progress.

對于核工業(yè)而言，為了解決福島相關(guān)問題最終成本仍然有不確定性，同樣的不確定性也存在對核電站運(yùn)營的潛在影響。在2013年4月NRC的一次會議上，Dominion能源估計，福島后行動的成本將高達(dá)3000萬-4000萬美元/機(jī)組，對于它的6個核反應(yīng)堆群而言將需要1.8億-2.4億美元?！赌甓饶茉凑雇?014》（AEO2014）沒有包括在核電裝機(jī)和發(fā)電量上的后福島潛在影響，但成本和運(yùn)行的影響、NRC的行動和行業(yè)行動進(jìn)展情況等將在未來年度能源展望中被監(jiān)測。